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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Bills and Notes-Depository Bank As Holder in Due Course1
Walnut Cove Motor Company was a depositor of plaintiff State
Planters Bank and, as of the close of business October 17, 1957, had a
balance of 712 dollars, against which there were then awaiting payment
its checks in an amount over 12,000 dollars received that afternoon by
the bank in the mail from its correspondents. The president of the bank
told Massey, the president of the motor company, that unless he, got
funds in to cover these waiting checks by noon the next day, October 18,
they would be returned dishonored to the presenting banks. To raise
the demanded funds Massey sold to defendant the next morning in
Charlotte at full price several cars which were burdened with mortgages
and received defendant's check for over 11,000 dollars payable to the
motor company. He deposited this check with a few other small items
to the credit of the motor company and the bank forthwith paid the
waiting checks which the deposit was to cover. The defendant having
learned of the fraud perpetrated on it, stopped payment on its 11,000
dollar check, and since the motor company thereafter never made any
deposits of consequence2 and its president, Massey, disappeared,3 the
bank could not collect from the account or the depositor the money it
had put out on the strength of this check so it sued the defendant drawer.
If the law is to recognize any class of people who can trample under
foot the defenses of defrauded makers of commercial paper, it would
look as if this bank, admittedly without notice of the fraud and with its
money sunk beyond recall in this check should be one of such. The
court so held but not without effort because of complications introduced
by pronouncements in earlier cases.
DEPOSITORY BANK AS COLLECTING AGENT
The check in suit was indorsed4 and presented by Massey to the
receiving teller for credit to the motor company along with a deposit
slip carrying a standard stipulation that "this Bank acts only as de-
1 State Planters Bank v. Courtesy Motors, Inc., 250 N.C. 466, 109 S.E.2d 189
(1959).
'lso large amounts of additional checks of the motor company were later
presented and returned unpaid. Problems presented by the subsequent deposits
and withdrawals are dealt with in note 15, infra.
'Record, p. 28; 250 N.C. at 469, 109 S.E.2d at 192.
' The endorsement was by rubber stamp and in blank. It was admitted to
have been authorized and valid, Brief for Appellant, p. 26, although the erroneous
contention was there made that it was a restrictive endorsement under N.I.L.
§ 36(2), G.S. § 25-42(2). Of course as between the parties -by separate agreement
an agency may be created though the form of the endorsement does not disclose it
and subsequent parties would not be on notice of the agency.
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positor's collecting agent and .... it may charge back any [unpaid]
item . . . ."5 Examining the case first on the assumption that this
stipulation represented the binding agreement of the parties, it is evident
that the bank was indorsee, hence holder,6 from the moment of deposit
and could become holder for value by making advances to or on behalf
of its principal7 even though, under our holdings, it, as agent, would
not have title or be "owner" of the paper.8 A commission merchant to
whom produce is consigned by a grower can get a lien on the produce by
advances to the shipper even though he does not get title or become
owner and the North Carolina court long since recognized the similarity
of that situation to that of advances made by a collecting bank.9
That would seem to be an end to the matter and it would be so if
the bank in fact, as assumed above, had paid out the full amount of the
check, i.e., as collecting agent had made advances to the full amount.
Under the first in, first out rule once approved in North Carolina 0
there is no question but what the bank here did so." But where, as in
this case, the right to charge back exists, North Carolina has apparently
'Record p. 39; 250 N.C. at 469, 109 S.E.2d at 191.
NIL § 191, G.S. § 25-1: "'Holder' means the payee or indorsee of a bill or
note, who is in possession of it....
"NIL § 27, G.S. § 25-32: "Where the holder has a lien on the instrument ....
he is deemed a holder for value to the extent of his lien." National Bank of
Phoenixville v. Bonsor, 38 Pa. Super. 275 (1909) ; Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp.
v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 161 F. Supp. 790 (D. Mass. 1958). The Uniform
Commercial Code (hereafter U.C.C., now the law in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts
and Kentucky) §§ 4-208, -209, adopts and extends this doctrine by enacting the
first in, first out rule. Section 4-208(2) and comment 2.
8 The N.I.L. does not use the term "owner" though it often refers to title. Cf.
American Bankers' Ass'n Bank Collection Code (adopted in 18 states, not N.C.)
§ 2 which treats depository banks as agents absent a contrary agreement but gives
them "the rights of an owner" to the extent that a credit given has been drawn
against. See also U.C.C. § 3-301. First Nat. Bank v. Rochamora, 193 N.C. 1,
136 S.E. 259 (1926) and other cases in North Carolina even deny that the bank
as agent is the real party in interest. Cf. Wellons v. Warren, 203 N.C. 178, 180,
165 S.E. 545, 546 (1932); but see Federal Reserve Bank v. Whitford, 207 N.C.
267, 176 S.E. 584 (1934). Those decisions would probably be otherwise if the
bank had made irretrievable advances as in the present case and had thus acquired
an "interest" in the paper. See language in Ledwell v. Shenandoah Milling Co.,
215 N.C. 371, 376, 377, 1 S.E.2d 841, 844 (1939), quoted in note 9, infra. No such
claim was made. It is believed the decisions are wrong anyway under N.I.L.
§§ 37 (2) and 51.
'Armour Packing Co. v. Davis, 118 N.C. 548, 555, 24 S.E. 365, 366 (1896),
quoting from In re State Bank, 56 Minn. 119, 124, 57 N.W. 336, 337 (1894) ; Giles
v. Perkins, 9 East 12, 14 (K.B. 1807), quoted in the principal case: Ledwell
v. Shenandoah Milling Co., 215 N.C. 371, 376, 377, 1 S.E.2d 841, 844 (1939):
"[T]he bank becomes a holder of the instrument, at least as collateral."; "the
... bank has an interest in the paper .... "
0United States National Bank v. MeNair, 114 N.C. 335, 19 S.E. 361 (1894);
Standing Stone Nat. Bank v. Walser, 162 N.C. 54, 77 S.E. 1006 (1913).
" By the close of business on October 19th the bank had paid out more on the
motor company's checks (12,303 dollars) than the sum of the company's opening
balance on October 18 (700 dollars) plus the total deposit that day of the check
in suit (11,142 dollars) and 300 dollars of small items credited at the same time.
(All sums in round figures.) Record p. 35. The deposit on the 19th of 421 dol-
lars which kept the account from being overdrawn would be irrelevant in a first in,
first out calculation.
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held that the collecting bank cannot be a holder for value to the extent
that it can recoup from the account by charge back after it has notice of
a defect in the paper it received. 1 2  Usually that has resulted in com-
plete defeat for the depository bank because the payee's account was
found ample to permit complete reimbursement by charging back.13
This is a purely equitable doctrine disregarding practicalities and techni-
calities as to when funds are paid out. There is something phony sound-
ing in a bank's claim to the harsh special rights of a holder in due course
against defrauded parties when all it has to do to make itself whole is
to write some debit figures on its depositor's account and return the
paper to him.1 4
Here the case is different however. As a result of some small de-
posits and withdrawals during the ensuing two days15 the account of
2 Worth Co. v. International Sugar Feed No. 2 Co., 172 N.C. 335, 90 S.E. 295
1916) ; Sterling Mills v. Saginaw Milling Co., 184 N.C. 461, 114 S.E. 756 (1922)jury question whether right to charge back existed). The facts in other cases
are so clear as to require no jury finding. See, e.g., Denton v. Shenandoah Milling
Co., 205 N.C. 77, 170 S.E. 107 (1933), discussed in note 13 infra.
"3 Cases cited note 12. In Denton v. Shenandoah Milling Co., 205 N.C. 77, 80,
170 S.E. 107, 109 (1933), where no deposit slip language was introduced but other
facts pointed to an agency, there was testimony that the depositor's account was
not always sufficient to stand a charge back but that would seemingly be no reason
why the bank should not get off the hook when it was. It is evident that under
the first in, first out rule an active account is likely to make the bank a holder for
value very soon while under the charge back rule a substantial balance will usually
defeat that claim for moderate sized items.14 In language of Hoke, J., dissenting in Standing Stone Nat. Bank v. Walser,
162 N.C. 54, 65, 66, 77 S.E. 1006, 1011 (1913), "[Tlhere is no evidence that ...
plaintiff, if it fails to recover, is or is likely to be out of pocket one cent by reason
of its alleged purchase," i.e., if it was denied recovery as a holder in due course
against a defrauded drawer. The implications of that statement cannot of course
be pushed too far or no one could be a holder in due course when he had an amply
solvent endorser who had received or waived notice of dishonor. The whole basic
principle of negotiability would be scrapped by such a sweeping doctrine. Limited
to the case of a bank with the right of charge back against a sufficient balance ithas equitable appeal. Accord, National Bank of Commerce v. Morgan, 207 Ala.
65, 92 So. 10 (1921) (account was always sufficient for charge back). This same
equitable approach-how is the bank hurt?-was carried to the point of technical
error in the homespun reasoning and language of the trial judge in Latham v.Spragins, 162 N.C. 404, 78 S.E. 282 (1913), where the bank had applied the de-
posited item to an overdraft (pre-existing debt, N.I.L. § 25) and later, on its dis-
honor, had charged it back, restoring the overdraft. The bank, said that worthyjudge to the jury, "were in the same fix after the transaction as before .... "
Id. at 405, 78 S.E. at 283.
"5 Record p. 35. The record is not satisfying on the matter of the small addi-
tional deposits received and the small charges made to the company's account
during this period. The president of the bank testified that it returned to corre-
spondents unpaid a large total of checks ("way up into the thousands," Record
p. 20) which came through on October 18th and on later days because the account
was insufficient and no new funds were produced to cover them. It may be that
the bank paid some small locally held checks which were presented later though
the president's testimony was that the practice of the bank was not to pay out of
order. Record p. 27, 2d par.; cf. Record p. 2 last par. While a bank has some lati-
tude in determining what order to follow in paying simultaneously presented items,
Chadd v. Byers State Bank, 111 Kan. 279, 206 Pac. 880 (1922); Castaline v.
National City Bank of Chelsea, 244 Mass. 416, 138 N.E. 398 (1923), it may violate
a duty to its correspondent in returning checks unpaid and paying others presented
later. See Standard Trust Co. v. Commercial National Bank, 166 N.C. 112, 122,
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the motor company stood at 124.90 dollars on October 22 when the bank
got notice of dishonor of the 11,000 dollar check of the defendant.'0 One
might take the view that the bank was thus a holder for value only for
the amount of the check less this 124 dollars which stood on its books
subject to being appropriated under the banker's lien. That would
seem to carry out logically the theory of earlier North Carolina cases.
And had the motor company's balance been 5,000 dollars instead of 124
dollars, it is believed the court would have so limited plaintiff's recovery
on the fraudulently obtained check in suit.17
DEPOSITORY BANK AS PURCHASER
So much for the case analyzed on the basis of plaintiff bank's being
a collecting agent. The complaint did not adopt that theory. It alleged
instead that the bank was the owner of the check.' This approach of
81 S.E. 1074, 1078 (1914) (also holding the drawee on the minority, constructive
acceptance doctrine) ; Note 7 N.C.L. REV. 191 (1929). See also Jacobson v. Bank
of Commerce, 66 Ill. App. 470 (1896), which, however, was decided under the
check-as-assignment doctrine then followed in that jurisdiction. But see U.C.C.§ 4-303(2) and comment 6 (Offic. Text, 1958).
"8 Or on October 23d. Record p. 19. There was some testimony by plaintiff's
president that this 124 dollars was not a real balance because of some collateral
transaction on which the bank was "stuck." Record p. 28. That collateral trans-
action seems to have been substantially a duplicate on a small scale (check of 200
dollars) of the one in dispute, i.e., plaintiff bank received for deposit from the motor
company and sent through for collection a check which the motor company had
fraudulently obtained for a mortgaged car delivered to the buyer without the
assent of the mortgagee. There was however, inter alia, a striking difference: the
drawee bank on this check overlooked a stop order and paid it to plaintiff. Under
the doctrine of Price v. Neal, 3 Burr, 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (1762), accepted to
the full extent in North Carolina, Woodward v. Savings & Trust Co., 178 N.C. 184,
100 S.E. 304 (1919) ; National Bank of Sanford v. Marshburn, 229 N.C. 104, 47
S.E.2d 793 (1948), the drawee bank there would seem precluded from recovering
its mistaken payment from plaintiff (unless plaintiff bank as to that check were
considered to be only bare agent of the motor company, fraudulent payee, and so
without rights of its own). BUrrroN, BILts & Norzs 638 (1943). That being so,
it is questionable whether plaintiff bank by voluntarily refunding the money which
it was lawfully entitled to keep, could diminish the motor company's balance by
charging the item back and thus increase its investment in the check on which it
is now suing (i.e., become a holder for value to a larger amount).
" Of course in no realistic sense can a check of 11,000 dollars be charged back
against an account of 124 dollars. As a matter of bookkeeping it could be done
and a heavy overdraft be created but that might be a poor tactical move since it
might be regarded as relinquishing rights on the paper and substituting a claim
against the depositor on his overdrawn account, although it ought to be regarded as
still having a security interest in the paper. Cf. Latham v. Spragins, 162 N.C.
404, 78 S.E. 282 (1913). In Lowrance Motor Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 238 F.2d
625 (5th Cir. 1957), relied on in the principal case, the judgment was for less than
the amount of the items in question "the difference being represented by an amount
recaptured by the bank from Moore's account." Perhaps the court would have
so limited the judgment if the bank had not appropriated the balance.
8 "That the plaintiff is the owner and holder in due course . . . ." Complaint,
para. III, Record p. 2. The findings, para. 9, even more emphatically adopt that
theory. (The intent of the parties was that the transaction constituted a sale.)
Record p. 52; 250 N.C. at 470, 471, 101 S.E. at 192, 193. The Uniform Commercial
Code has deliberately written down in importance the matter of status, although "it
may have importance in some residual areas not covered by specific rules." U.C.C.
§ 4-201, comments 1, 2 (Official Text, 1958).
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course involves a collision with the terms of the deposit slip which de-
clared the bank a collecting agent. The motor company listed its deposit
on that slip and would normally be considered to have adopted the
printed recital.19  But this deposit was not a normal one. The bank,
with some 12,000 dollars of the motor company's checks received from
correspondents and in hand for payment from a wholly insufficient
account, demanded that the motor company bring in fresh deposits to
prevent those checks being returned dishonored. 20 It was in response to
this demand that the motor company procured from the defendant by
fraud the check in suit and offered it to plaintiff bank to serve as the
source of funds for payment of the waiting checks. Disregarding the
agency recitals on the deposit slip and the technicalities of the parol
evidence rule it might be found (and it was found) 2 ' that the bank did
buy the check and made immediate22 payment for it by honoring that
amount or a greater amount of the motor company's checks then in hand
awaiting payment.
" See Oliver v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 176 N.C. 598, 600, 97 S.E.
490, 491 (1918) ; Coppersmith v. Aetna Ins. Co., 222 N.C. 14, 17, 21 S.E.2d 838,
839 (1942) ; 1 CoRBir, CONTRACTS §§ 32, 33 (1950). Compare cases of principal
adopting by delivery to a third party documents made out by an agent unauthorized
to execute them. Mondragon v. Mondragon, 113 Tex. 404, 257 S.W. 215 (1923).
There is authority that the deposit slip is only a receipt and its recitals are not
binding (do not create a contract), 9 C.J.S. Banks &# Banking §270 (1938), per-
haps by analogy to the rule as to such stipulations on parcel checkroom tickets and
the like handed to the bailor without his advance inspection or assent. The dif-
ferences however, are evident. The depositor uses the form repeatedly, he lists his
items on it and puts his name to it, perhaps not as a signature, but as a voluntary
affirmative act. He first delivers the form to the teller before the copy is returned
to him as a receipt. Opportunity to know the terms is certainly present. Some
banks go to great lengths to charge the depositor with knowledge and concur-
rence. A bank in the writer's vicinity, for example, prints a stipulation like that in
the principal case on the face of the slip, a somewhat differently worded one, with
charge back right repeated, on the back and the added assertion, "Delivery to the
Bank of items for collection or credit [Quaere, what distinction is intended?]
shall constitute acceptance of the above conditions by the depositor, in the absence
of written notice to the contrary at the time." Finally, the teller's rubber stamp
endorsement of the duplicate declares, "Out of town items received and forwarded
for collection at depositor's risk only until we have actual final payment" (Quaere,
what is final payment?) Compare Morris v. Cleve, 197 N.C. 253, 148 S.E. 253
(1929). At any rate many cases have treated the recital as creating a contract.
Ledwell v. Shenandoah Milling Co., 215 N.C. 371, 1 S.E.2d 841 (1939) (contract
found waived), which quotes Fine v. Receiver of Dickinson County Bank, 163 Va.
157, 160, 175 S.E. 863, 864 (1934). See also language in Taft v. Quinsigamond
Nat'l Bank, 172 Mass. 363, 52 N.E. 387 (1899) : "So a bank by general notices
printed on its pass-books or deposit slips, or otherwise brought to the knowledge
of its depositor . . . may define its position as that of agent or purchaser."
20 Record p. 15.
Findings, para. 9, Record p. 52. Since nothing was said in the conversations
between the bank and depositor about purchase or sale this is a probably permis-
sible but certainly not a necessary interpretation of the intended agreement. The
evidence would not seem sufficient for the purpose under the agency presumption of
U.C.C. § 4-201 (1) (contrary intent must clearly appear) and comment 2 (calling
for written evidence of intent to revoke agency).
2 Because of some complications in the bank's routine, Record pp. 25-26, about
half of these checks were not debited to the motor company's account until the
next day, October 19, Record p. 35, although remittance seems to have been made
to the presenting banks on the 18th. Record pp. 33-34.
1960]
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But can the parol evidence rule properly be disregarded? Various
arguments suggest themselves.23  One approach is to declare, as did the
opinion in the principal case, "The deposit contract is a matter about
which plaintiff and Motor Company had a legal right to make their
own contract, so long as the rights of third parties are not injuriously
affected,24 and it is not contrary to law or public policy .... What the
contract between them is with respect to the title of this cheque depends
on their intention to be determined as a fact from the evidence.
25
Put in this broad form it might seem that the trier of the facts, here
the trial judge, may give controlling effect to the oral preliminary dis-
cussion which he here interprets to mean that a sale was intended,
although as so interpreted, it contradicts the printed stipulation accom-
panying the actual deposit. If this wide open view of the matter is taken
little seems left of the parol evidence rule, especially that rule as it has
usually been applied in North Carolina, where the test for rejection
seems to have been, Does the claimed oral agreement contradict the
ultimate writing ?26 It certainly does so here.
But, as pointed out by writers on evidence,27 the parol evidence rule
properly considered requires first a finding by the court whether under
all the circumstances the final written terms would normally be intended
by the parties to embody, "integrate" in Wigmore's word, their agree-
ment and so render any preceding oral commitments on the specific
matter of no effect. If, objectively tested, that was not their intention,
then the jury will find whether there were in truth such oral commit-
ments and what they were.
" If it were the depositor seeking to escape the consequences of the printed
stipulation he might try to invoke the fine print or "trap for the unwary" doctrine
recognized in some states, for the stipulation is usually in fine print. But not only
does the present fact situation seem to fit poorly into that rule (depositor re-
peatedly used the form and had put his name to a like stipulation on the signature
card when opening the account) but certainly the bank which furnished the form
can put forward no claim to being prejudiced. For an interesting case where such
an argument was summarily rejected see People v. Michigan Ave. Trust Co., 242
Ill. App. 579, 597 (1926).
24 This clause presents an interesting area of speculation: since in the view of
the plaintiff, and apparently of the court, the plaintiff, to extinguish defendant's
defense of fraud, must make itself out a purchaser rather than an agent, the de-
fendant, a third party, will be most injuriously affected by allowing the intent of
the parties, as shown by their oral arrangements, to prevail.
" 250 N.C. at 472, 109 S.E.2d at 194.
2 Chadboum and McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule in North Carolina, 9
N.C.L. Rrv. 151, 156, 176 (1931); STANsBuRY, North Carolina E24dence, § 253
(1946). Compare: "This agreement [deposit slip stipulation] being in writing it
is not subject to contradiction by proof that another and a different agreement was
in fact at the time made." Ledwell v. Shenandoah Milling Co., 215 N.C. 371, 376,
1 S.E.2d 841, 844 (1939), quoted by the court in the present case but in another
connection (waiver) and without noting its bearing on this point.2 WiGmoRE, EvIDENCE, §§ 2425, 2430 (3d ed. 1940) : Chadbourn & McCormick,
szpra note 26 at 154. The statement in Neal v. Marrone, 239 N.C. 73, 78, 79
S.E.2d 239, 242 (1953), quoted in Walker v. Home, 149 F. Supp. 457, 460 (W.D.
N.C. 1957), comes close to stating the rule in the same form.
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Here there seems ample reason for finding that in special pressing
circumstances, where urgent exchanges took place between the depositor
and the top officer of the bank, it was not the intent of the parties that
a printed stock form later used in depositing with a teller the item in
question should be regarded as an integration of the transaction. That
effectively disposes of the parol evidence rule for this case and the de-
cision can be reached, it seems, with the blessing of Mr. Wigmore.
Our supreme court in fact seemed very near to placing the matter on
this basis when just following the language quoted above and again later
in the opinion it laid emphasis on the "facts and attendant circumstances
surrounding the making of the deposit." 28 This is especially true when
the trial judge here sat as a jury and made whatever findings were to be
made.
Another way to avoid the force of the printed terms is to say, as did
the opinion, that they are in the interest of the bank, may be waived by
it and can be found to have been waived by paying the depositors checks.
It is true, as already noted, that the banks or their counsel prepare
the recitals and supply the forms on which they appear and that pre-
sumably the terms are in their interest in the sense that the stipulations
are what in general the banks want.2 9  And if, for example, the form
says that the bank will not honor checks drawn against uncollected
funds, it might later waive this restriction by nevertheless paying such
checks.
But to say that by making advances even up to the full amount of
the checks it "waives" its status of agent and becomes a buyer seems to
go beyond the normal implications of the term. The bank certainly
does not waive its right to charge back and that, in North Carolina at
least, it is a key indicator of agency.30
Nevertheless the court had ample outside and some North Carolina
authority for this position 3' and no matter how unsatisfactory it seems
analytically and how unnecessary it is as justification for finding the
bank a holder in due course, the result reached seems sound.
" Cases elsewhere have found the printed stipulations overriden by far less
impressive special facts than those here, often solely on the ground that drawings
were permitted. 59 A.L.R.2d 1173, 1187 (1958).
"' Like most other people the banks want what they think is best for their own
interests but in the complicated area of bank collections, where any position of
advantage one way may be disadvantage another, their vacillation over the years
indicates that they are not at all sure what they want. Right now they say in their
forms that they will be agents. But note the shift in position from restrictive to
unrestrictive endorsements described in First Nat'l Bank of Belmont v. First Nat'l
Bank of Barnesville, 58 Ohio St. 207, 214, 50 N.E. 723 (1898), followed by the
contrary shift in the banks' own legislation, A.B.A. Bank Collection Code § 4,
making "For Deposit" and "Pay any bank or banker" endorsements restrictive.
"'Denton v. Shenandoah Milling Co., 205 N.C. 77, 170 S.E. 107 (1933), dis-
cussed in note 13, spra.
"59 A.I.R2d 1173, 1188-89 (1958).
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SUMMARY
The court said in the present case: "The real determinative question
presented to the Trial Judge was whether plaintiff is the owner or a
collecting agency of this cheque .... ,,32
If the plaintiff had not chosen to sue as purchaser and owner83 that
question would not have been determinative, perhaps not even important.
The N.I.L. recognizes no such person as "owner" or "owner in due
course."3 4 All that plaintiff need be is holder in due course.
Considering, however, the poor reception often accorded in North
Carolina cases to depository banks dressed in the garb of agent and that
the charge-back right is part of that garb, it is understandable why plain-
tiff's counsel preferred to present their client in other attire if possible.
But the crucial question for such a plaintiff in cases where it wishes
to assert rights35 against drawers or claimants 36 is not whether it is or
is not an agent but whether it has given value either by making ad-
vances, if agent, or paying part or all of the purchase price, if buyer.
And that in turn will depend in most cases on the answer to the ques-
tions what is the giving of value and when is it determined?
The following analysis and conclusions are ventured as representing
the now state of the North Carolina law :37
82 250 N.C. at 472, 109 S.E.2d at 194.
"Defendant in turn largely -pinned its hopes on arguing that plaintiff was only
an agent. Understandably it would not want to becloud the issue which it thought
might give it complete victory by arguments promising only to reduce an adverse
verdict of 12,000 dollars by 124 dollars.
", See the discussion of this point in note 8, s-upra.
85 Where other questions are concerned, such as -who shall bear the loss in case
of a failed intermediary bank, the depository, charged with being owner, will of
course hasten back into its agency role and its exculpatory recitals. See a still
useful analysis of the whole area, Steffen, The Check Collection Muddle, 10 Ti-.
L. RE%. 537 (1936).
"Many of the cases where the bank seeks to be found a holder in due course
involve attachments by the depositor's creditors. Those cases are considered gen-
erally to present the same ultimate problem as ours and are cited indifferently herein
as they are by others, although owner and holder in due course are not by any
means the same. For example, a donee may be owner. There may be less public
interest in aiding creditors of payees who, as creditors, throw monkey wrenches
into the collection process by their attachments than there is in encouraging banks
to aid business by allowing drafts against items in process, especially when a very
small percentage of paper is dishonored. On the other hand the attaching creditors
are commonly local people who, without this weapon, may have to go abroad to
assert their claimed rights.
" Many cases have involved claims of out of state depository banks and those
banks might in some of them have fared better if counsel had noted the possibilities
of that fact. The legal effect of transfers, by endorsement or otherwise, is governed
by the law of the place where made. Embiricos v. Anglo-Austrian Bank [1905]
1 K.B. Div. 677, 74 L.J..K.B. 326 (Ct. App.) (leading case-forged endorsement
in Roumania) ; REsTATEmENT, CONFLiCr OF LAW, § 349 (1934) ; U.C.C. § 4-102(2).
comment c (Official text 1958) ; Hatcher v. McMorine, 15 N.C. 122, 124 (1833)
(endorser's liability). Contra, Badger Mach. Co. v. U.S. Bank & Trust Co., 166
Wis. 18, 163 N.W. 188 (1917) (transfer for pre-existing debt).
In Ledwell v. Shenandoah Milling Co., 215 N.C. 371, 374, 1 S.E. 2d 841, 843
(1939) the court said, "As to this, [the contention that Virginia law governed the
deposit in a Norfolk bank] we do not take issue," though its examination of Vir-
ginia authority did not help plaintiff. Similarly in a case where the depository
[Vol. 38
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(1) Where a right to charge back is reserved but that right has
become permanently worthless by payings out from the account before
the depository bank has notice of equities, the bank becomes a holder
for value, whether it is agent or purchaser.38
(2) Where a right to charge back is reserved and the depositor's
account remains ample or is replenished at any later time before suit so
that the right can be exercised effectively, the depository bank is not a
holder for value but must look to the account for reimbursement. And
if the account is only partly sufficient, the bank will be a holder for value
only for the excess, i.e., for the amount of the item less the maximum
balance it can appropriate.39
(3) In situations like those in paragraph (2) it is possible that the
distinction between agent and purchaser takes on significance in North
Carolina and that the first in, first out rule4" will be applied in case of
a purchase so that the bank becomes a holder for value once and for all
when under that rule4 ' the full amount of the item in question has been
was a San Francisco bank and the garnishment was in Milwaukee, the Wisconsin
court after noting California law, found it to be "the majority rule" and the same
as that in Wisconsin. Blatz Brewing Co. v. Richardson & Richardson, Inc. 245
Wis. 567, 15 N.W2d 819 (1944).
" Past North Carolina cases seem to have held that the right to charge back
makes the bank an agent, Denton v. Shenandoah Milling Co., 205 N.C. 77, 170 S.E.
107 (1933), which doctrine would open the above statement to criticism in its
speaking of a purchaser who had such a right. But the present case, in finding the
bank a purchaser, does not find that the right to charge back was given up and
the writer does not believe the facts would warrant such a finding. So North
Carolina may now recognize, as does the United States Supreme Court, City of
Douglas v. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 271 U.S. 489 (1926), such a combina-
tion as a purchaser with a right to charge back, paralleled in chattel transactions
by a purchase on condition with a right to return for credit.
" Cf. Lowrence Motor Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 238 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1957),
discussed in note 17, supra. The doctrine of United States Nat'l Bank v. McNair,
114 N.C. 335, 19 S.E. 361 (1894), that when a substantial amount has been paid
out the bank is a holder for value for the full amount is no longer supportable
under N.I.L. § 54, at least unless the view of Professor Beutel is adopted, that the
mere giving of bank credit or the giving of it with the privilege of drawing makes
the bank a holder for value. BRANNAx, NEGoTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAw 499 (7th
ed. 1948). That would go further than the "substantial amount" rule.
"An alternative rule would make the bank a holder for value to some extent
only when the depositor's balance fell below the amount of the item in suit and a
holder for full value only when and if the balance fell to zero. But this too would
defeat the full equitable effect of the charge back rule since it would disregard later
deposits once the account had been enough depleted. It is usually impossible to tell
from the cases what the state of accounts was after the crucial deposit. In Moon-
Traylor Co. v. Gray Smith Milling Co., 176 N.C. 407, 97 S.E. 213 (1918) the
depositor's account became heavily overdrawn a few days after the bank had
credited the item whose proceeds were attached by a creditor of the drawer but
the mistake was made of having an intermediary collecting bank assert ownership
rather than the depository which had gotten thus deeply involved.
" Some support for this once-for-all cut off date may be found in N.I.L. § 26,
G.S. § 25-31: "Where value has at any time been given for the instrument the
holder is deemed a holder for value in respect to all parties who became such prior
to that time." When read in connection with N.I.L. § 54, G.S. § 25-60, however, it
may be that the object of the section, which was taken from the British Bills of
Exchange Act, is in its final clause, indicating the parties whose rights are affected
by the giving of value.
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paid out 42 and subsequent replenishment of the account will not defeat
that status, once so obtained. It may be argued that the principal case
supports this position. If it does so, it repudiates in large measure the
strong equitable basis of the charge back rule, i.e., that to the extent that
a bank can avoid loss by merely debiting or appropriating a depositor's
balance it ought not be regarded as a holder for value and so prevail
against a maker or drawer with defenses.
(4) Where there is no right to charge back43 the bank becomes a
holder for value under the first in, first out rule, i.e., after the previous
balance and perhaps any simultaneously deposited good funds are paid
out. This rule would apparently have no relation to an agent since
agency almost certainly implies the right to charge back.
M. S. B.
Constitutional Law-Due Process-Right to Counsel in Pre-Trial
Situations-When It Arises
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States has been interpreted as requiring that
every defendant charged with a capital crime be represented by counsel.1
How soon this right arises, however, is often an extremely difficult ques-
tion. In Crooker v. California2 the United States Supreme Court in a
five-to-four decision held that due process was not violated when the
accused who requested counsel shortly after his arrest was denied it for
almost thirty hours during which time he made a confession which was
admitted in evidence at the trial where he was convicted of murder.
The Court stated that "due process does not always require immediate
honoring of a request to obtain one's own counsel in the hours after
arrest . . . . 3 Rather, the Court ruled that the accused is entitled to
," Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 161 F. Supp.
790 (D. Mass. 1958) applied this rule without inquiry as to the later state of the
depositor's account in a case where the agency relationship was found. This de-
cision, per Wyzanski, D.J., is the best reasoned of recent cases in this area, although
in applying Massachusetts law (and influenced by the Uniform Commercial Code,
then shortly to become effective in the Commonwealth) it properly ignored what
has become so important in North Carolina cases, the right to charge back.
" This was the situation in Franklin Nat!l Bank v. Roberts Bros. Co., 168 N.C.
473, 84 S.E. 706 (1915). This assumes an almost non-existent state of affairs today
with banks universally inserting stipulations in their dealings not only on deposit
slips but on advice forms, etc. Even if one of these forms was not used, as in case
of acknowledging receipt of an item by letter, there is the original signature card
and the continuous custom to fall back on to support the claimed right.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
'357 U.S. 433 (1958). The majority was composed of Frankfurter, Burton,
who since has retired, Clark, who wrote the opinion of the Court, Harlan, and
Whittaker, JJ. Douglas, J., with the concurrence of Warren, Ch. J., and Black
and Brennan, JJ., dissented.
3Id. at 441.
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